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I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, over six-hundred thousand children are victims of child
abuse and neglect in the United States.1 As a result of this abuse, children
can spend months or even years in the foster care system, where some are
subject to further abuse.2 Despite recent trends, many states continue to
deny these foster children their Fourteenth Amendment due process right
to counsel in dependency proceedings. 3 Foster children are the most
vulnerable and personally impacted parties in dependency proceedings and
deserve the same zealous legal advocacy as their parents and the State.
The source of this deprivation is the well-intentioned—but insufficient
—Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). CAPTA is one
of several federal statutes that provide federal funding for abused and
1. See FIRST STAR INST. & CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED & NEGLECTED
CHILDREN 8 (4th ed. 2019). In 2017, child protective service agencies received approximately
4.1 million referrals for abuse and neglect, but only 674,000 children were considered
victims of abuse or neglect. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) State
Grants, CHILD.’S BUREAU (May 17, 2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/resource/captastate-grants [https://perma.cc/UZ7Q-7MYR].
2. See Suparna Malempati, The Illusion of Due Process for Children in Dependency
Proceedings, 44 CUMB. L. REV. 181, 189 (2013).
3. See FIRST STAR INST. & CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., supra note 1, at 9–10. Since
First Star Institute and the Children’s Advocacy Institute (CAI) first started grading states
twelve years ago, thirty-one states have improved the quality of legal representation they
provide children in dependency cases. Id. at 7. However, six states received a “D” and
five received an “F” in the most recent report. Id. at 23. These grades reflect not just
whether the state requires representation but also the type and degree of representation
they require. See id. at 17–19.
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neglected children.4 In exchange for federal funding, states must meet certain
requirements.5 The Act requires that all children in dependency proceedings
be assigned a “guardian ad litem” (GAL) to advocate for the best interest
of the child.6 This GAL may be an attorney or an adult non-attorney, such
as a court-appointed special advocate (CASA).7 Given the option, some
states have opted for the latter, which is arguably a violation of children’s
due process rights.8
First Star Institute and the Children’s Advocacy Institute’s latest edition
of A Child’s Right to Counsel: A National Report Card on Legal Representation
for Abused & Neglected Children outlines the effect this provision has on
children. The report grades states and the District of Columbia on the quality
of legal representation it provides to children in dependency proceedings.9
This report found that seventeen of the fifty-one state statutes allow
inconsistent appointment and often deny discretionary appointment of
legal counsel for abuse and neglect proceedings.10

4. See ROBERT C. FELLMETH & JESSICA K. HELDMAN, CHILD RIGHTS & REMEDIES
328–29 (4th ed. 2019).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b). Note that the funding for CAPTA is minuscule compared
to other child protection programs such as the Child Welfare Act. See FIRST STAR &
CHILD .’S ADVOC. INST., S HAME ON U.S. 10 (2015). Poor funding and lack of federal
enforcement have led to widespread non-compliance by states. See id. at 9–10. One
solution is for Congress to “tie states’ receipt of all federal foster care and child welfare
funding to their compliance with all federal foster care and child welfare requirements and
minimum standards” and require that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
actively monitor and enforce such requirements. Id. at 10. For an in-depth look at how
the “federal government enacts, monitors, interprets, funds, and/or enforces federal child
welfare laws,” see generally First Star & Child.’s Advoc. Inst., supra, at 3, 10.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (“[R]equiring that in every case involving a
victim of child abuse or neglect which results in a judicial proceeding, a guardian ad litem,
who has received training appropriate to the role, including training in early childhood,
child, and adolescent development, and who may be an attorney or a court appointed
special advocate who has received training appropriate to that role (or both), shall be
appointed to represent the child in such proceedings—(I) to obtain first-hand, a clear
understanding of the situation and needs of the child; and (II) to make recommendations
to the court concerning the best interests of the child . . . .”).
7. Id.
8. See FIRST STAR INST. & CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., supra note 1, at 8–10.
9. See id. at 7. In addition to determining whether a state requires representation,
the report also looks at the type of representation required, education and training requirements,
confidentiality, whether the child is considered a party to the proceeding, and caseload
standards. Id. at 17–19.
10. See id. at 7 (“From our current view: 34 of the 51 statutes (66%) require counsel
for children in abuse and neglect proceedings.”).
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This Comment will address children’s constitutional right to have legal
counsel in dependency proceedings. Dependency proceedings include the
entire dependency process, from the moment the child is removed from
the parent’s custody until the child returns home or ages out of the foster
care system. This Comment will not address the constitutional rights of
parents to have legal counsel11 or the constitutional rights of children in private
custody or other family law matters.12 Nor will it address the type of legal
representation that children should receive.13
While this Comment argues that all children have a constitutional right
to legal counsel in dependency proceedings, it will focus on two illustrative
states. This will allow for a more detailed analysis that can apply to other
states. The states that continue to deny children their due process right to
legal counsel fall into one of two categories: (1) states that give courts complete
discretion to assign legal counsel, and (2) states that require courts to assign
legal counsel in certain circumstances but in all other circumstances allow
for complete discretion.14 The analysis will focus on one state from each

11. The Supreme Court held that indigent parents do not have a categorical right to
counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981); see also infra Section IV.B (discussing the Lassiter case). Thus,
it is up to the discretion of state legislatures and courts to determine when to appoint legal
counsel for parents in dependency proceedings. Vivek S. Sankaran, Moving Beyond
Lassiter: The Need for a Federal Statutory Right to Counsel for Parents in Child Welfare
Cases, 44 J. LEGIS. 1, 2 (2017). At least five states have relied on Lassiter to deny parents
a categorical right to counsel. Id. at 15 (explaining that Nevada, Mississippi, Delaware,
Montana and Wyoming courts have relied on Lassiter to deny parents an absolute right to
counsel).
12. For more on the issue of children’s right to legal counsel in private custody
matters, see generally Amy E. Halbrook, Custody: Kids, Counsel and the Constitution,
DUKE J. CONST. L. & P UB. P OL’Y, 2016–2017, at 179 (arguing that children in private
custody matters are entitled to legal counsel under the Due Process Clause).
13. While child advocates agree that children in dependency proceedings need legal
counsel, there is a lot of debate as to what such representation should encompass. See
Suparna Malempati, Beyond Paternalism: The Role of Counsel for Children in Abuse and
Neglect Proceedings, 11 U.N.H. L. REV. 97, 110 (2013). The two main views are the bestinterest model and the client-directed model. Id. at 110–11. Under the best-interest model,
the attorney advocates for what they believe is in the best interest of the child rather than
the child’s express desires. Id. at 111. Opponents of this view are concerned that attorneys
will make decisions based on their personal values rather than what is objectively in the
best interest of the child. See id. at 113–14. The client-directed model requires that the
attorney assume the traditional attorney role and advocate for the child’s express desires.
Id. at 111. Critics of this model argue that children are too young and immature to
advocate for their own wellbeing, and attorneys will have to advocate for positions that do
not promote the best interest of the child. See id. at 117–18.
14. See generally F IRST S TAR I NST . & C HILD .’ S ADVOC . INST ., supra note 1
(providing an in-depth look at state laws governing counsel for children in dependency
proceedings).
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of these categories: Indiana as a category one state and Florida as a category
two state.
Part II of this Comment will provide an explanation of dependency
proceedings and the actors involved, as well as an explanation of the
federal and state statutes that affect dependency proceedings. Part III will
provide a brief overview of the history of children’s constitutional rights
and will argue In re Gault set the stage for providing legal counsel for
children in dependency proceedings. Part IV of this Comment will examine
the United States Supreme Court cases that govern the right to counsel in
civil proceedings. This section will focus on Mathews v. Eldridge and Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services. Part V will argue that under the Mathews
analysis, children in Indiana and Florida—and by extension, all children
in dependency proceedings—are entitled to legal counsel as a matter of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lastly, Part VI proposes
amendments to CAPTA requiring legal counsel for all children in dependency
proceedings.
II. CONTEXT OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN DEPENDENCY CASES
In order to understand the importance of foster children’s rights to an
attorney, it is necessary to understand the nature and process of dependency
proceedings and how they differ from other civil proceedings. Additionally,
it is important to understand the federal and state laws that govern juvenile
courts.
A. Dependency Proceedings
States generally follow the same basic structure for dependency proceedings.15
Initially, a state welfare agency will conduct an investigation based on
reports from law enforcement, social workers, private citizens, schools, or
other concerned parties.16 If the agency determines that there was abuse
or neglect, it files a petition with the state juvenile court.17 If the state
welfare agency removes the child from the home, the court must hold
a detention hearing to determine if the child should remain in state custody

15. See Marvin Ventrell, Evolution of the Dependency Component of the Juvenile
Court, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Fall 1998, at 17, 31 (discussing the “best interest” standard, a
child-centered principle used by the modern dependency court).
16. Malempati, supra note 2, at 187.
17. Id. at 188; Ventrell, supra note 15, at 31.
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or return to their parents during the pending proceedings to determine
parental fitness.18
At the arraignment hearing, the parents can either admit or deny the
allegations of abuse or neglect.19 If the parent denies the allegations, then
the case is set for an adjudication hearing.20 As required by CAPTA, the
State should assign the child a GAL.21
The adjudication hearing is conducted like a civil trial and adheres to
most rules of civil procedure and evidence.22 The parties may testify,
cross-examine witnesses, and present expert testimony; however, there is
no jury, and the State must prove the alleged abuse or neglect by a
preponderance of the evidence.23 If the State fails to prove the abuse or
neglect, the case is dismissed, and the child returns to the custody of the
parents. If the State does prove abuse or neglect, the court sets a disposition
hearing.24
At the disposition hearing, the judge must approve a case plan for the
parent and decide the child’s placement. The goal of the case plan is to
correct the issues that lead to removal so the parent and child can be reunited.25
While the parent works on the case plan, the child may be placed with
approved relatives, foster family care providers, foster care agencies,
18. Dependency Case Process, OFF. OF CRIM. CONFLICT AND CIV. REG’L COUNS.,
https://flrc2.org/dependency.html [https://perma.cc/9EJN-346J].
19. Id.
20. Dependency Case Process, supra note 18.
21. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (“[R]equiring that in every case involving
a victim of child abuse or neglect which results in a judicial proceeding, a guardian ad
litem . . . shall be appointed to represent the child in such proceedings . . . .”). Additionally,
states that require legal representation will assign an attorney to indigent parents. See IND.
CODE § 31–32–4–1 (2019) (stating that persons entitled to counsel include parents in “a
proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship”); FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2019)
(“Parents must be informed by the court of their right to counsel in dependency proceedings at
each stage of the dependency proceedings. Parents who are unable to afford counsel must
be appointed counsel.”). According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a person is indigent if the
court finds that they are “financially unable to pay filing fees and court costs . . . .” Indigent,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
22. Malempati, supra note 2, at 188.
23. Dependency Case Process, supra note 18; JANE NUSBAUM FELLER ET AL., NAT’L
CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, WORKING WITH THE COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION 44,
60 (1992). This is a critical stage of the proceedings in which a child would require an
attorney as opposed to a GAL. As a non-attorney, the guardian ad litem would have less
expertise in cross-examination and presenting evidence. See FELLMETH & HELDMAN,
supra note 4, at 342; see also infra Section V.B.2.b.
24. Dependency Case Process, supra note 18.
25. See FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 328. Case plans often include
parenting classes, psychological counseling, substance abuse rehabilitation, obtaining safe
and adequate housing, or other programs depending on the basis for removal. Id. Parents
will typically have twelve months to complete their case plan to regain custody of their
child. Id.
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or in institutional group homes.26 Other issues the court must address are
the child’s health care needs, education, and contact with family members.27
Federal law requires that courts hold a review hearing at least every six
months to review the child’s placement and the parent’s case plan. 28
However, children can remain in foster care for months or even years,
while their parent tries to complete the case plan.29
If reunification efforts fail or the parents meet certain requirements
under the Social Securities Act,30 the State may request a termination of
parental rights hearing.31 If the State can prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that the parents are “unfit,” then parental rights are terminated.32
After the parent’s rights are terminated, the child becomes eligible for
adoption and remains a dependent under the jurisdiction of the court until
that child is adopted or ages out of the system.33
Note that throughout this process, the child should have a GAL. 34 In
the dependency context, the duties of a GAL vary from state to state.35 A
26. Id. In 2018, only 32% of foster children were placed with a relative. CHILD.’S
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT #26, at 1 (2019).
27.
Malempati, supra note 2, at 189 (citing DONALD N. DUQUETTE & ANN M.
HARALAMBIE, CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE 357–58 (2d ed. 2010).
28. Dependency Case Process, supra note 18; 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B). Within
twelve months of the child’s removal, and every twelve months thereafter so long as the
child remains in foster care, the court must hold a permanency hearing to review the child’s
long-term permanency plan. Id. § 675(5)(C). The court “determines whether and, if
applicable, when the child will be: (i) Returned to [the custody of] the parent; (ii) Placed
for adoption with the title IV–E agency filing a petition for termination of parental rights;
(iii) Referred for legal guardianship; (iv) Placed permanently with a fit and willing relative;
or (v) Placed in another living arrangement . . . .” 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20 (2011).
29. Malempati, supra note 2, at 189. According to the 2018 Adoption and Foster
Care Analysis and Reporting System Report, approximately 54% of foster children had
been in foster care for a year or more. See CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note 26, at 2.
30. The State must file for termination of parental rights proceedings if the parent
committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child, or “aided or abetted, attempted,
conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter, or
committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to
another child of the parent . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
31. FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 328; Dependency Case Process, supra
note 18.
32. FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 328. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 769 (1982) (holding a state must prove parental unfitness at a termination of parental
rights hearing by at least clear and convincing evidence to satisfy due process).
33. FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 328.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii).
35. For example, Michigan, Alabama, and Colorado all require that the GAL be an
attorney, while Arizona allows the GAL to be an attorney or a CASA. FIRST STAR INST.
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GAL is a special guardian appointed by the court to prosecute or defend,
on behalf of an infant or incompetent, a suit to which he is a party, and
such guardian is considered an officer of the court to represent the interests
of the infant or incompetent in the litigation.36 As officers of the court,
lay GALs are not subject to the same ethical rules as attorneys and do not
have to advocate for the child’s wishes.37 Therefore, the type of representation
a child receives turns on whether the assigned GAL is an attorney or a
layperson, such as a CASA. A CASA is usually a non-attorney volunteer
and therefore, cannot represent children in court as efficiently as an attorney.38
Attorneys are trained to file legal motions, evaluate evidence, subpoena
and cross-examine witnesses, engage in assured confidential communication
with clients, file a writ, and otherwise appeal a court’s decision.39 Regardless
of how well-intentioned they are, laypersons are limited in their ability to
provide the same benefits as legal counsel.40
B. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
Congress did not address the issue of children’s right to legal counsel
in dependency proceedings until it passed CAPTA in 1974. 41 To qualify
& CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., supra note 1, at 40, 44, 52, 91. Additionally, Connecticut and
Georgia require that the GAL adhere to traditional rules of professional conduct by
advocating for the child’s interests, while Delaware only requires that the GAL make the
child’s interests known to the court. Id. at 55, 57, 65.
36. See Guardian Ad Litem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
37. Malempati, supra note 2, at 194. There is some debate as to whether forcing
attorneys to follow traditional rules of confidentiality with children in dependency
proceedings produces the best outcome. See Cindy S. Lederman & Susan Somers, Let’s
Be Clear: Children in Florida’s Dependency Court Already Have Attorneys, MIA. HERALD
(Jan. 23, 2018, 9:51 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article196292
789.html [https://perma.cc/J3UY-UBNW]. Cindy Lederman, a Florida circuit court judge,
argues that when attorneys advocate for what the child wants rather than what would be in
their best interest the child is ultimately harmed. Id. This speaks more to the issue of what
type of legal representation a child should receive than the right to counsel. States that
guarantee counsel can establish their own rules of conduct for attorneys that align with
their concerns and beliefs about what is best for children in dependency proceedings.
38. FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 342; see infra Section V.B.2.b. Arguably,
the use of a lay GAL instead of an attorney GAL stems from the idea of parens patriae.
See infra Section III.A. However, when a child is a party to judicial proceedings, and all
other parties have legal representation, due process issues arise. See FIRST STAR INST. &
CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., supra note 1, at 10 (quoting Class Action Complaint for Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief at 2, Nicole K. v. Marion County, No. 3:19-CV-00025-RLY-MPB (S.D.
Ind. Feb. 6, 2019)).
39. FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 342.
40. This is not to say that CASAs are obsolete. They serve an important function
in the dependency system. Id. (noting that lay-CASAs monitor the placement and status
of foster children). Rather, a child could have both a CASA/GAL and an attorney.
41. Malempati, supra note 2, at 186.
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for federal funding under CAPTA, states must provide every child in
dependency proceedings with a GAL that may be an attorney or a courtappointed advocate.42 The Act does not provide any guidance for GALs
aside from requiring that they: (1) “obtain first-hand, a clear understanding of
the situation and needs of the child;” and (2) “make recommendations to
the court concerning the best interests of the child . . . .”43
C. Social Security Act - Title IV Funding
Congress also provides federal funding for abused or neglected children
under the Social Securities Act.44 The largest source of such funding falls
under Title IV-E.45 Under the Act, eligible states can receive federal funding
for foster care and adoption programs, including up to 50% reimbursement
for administrative expenditures.46 Under the new Child Welfare Policy
Manual, the federal government will reimburse states for up to 50% of the
cost of providing legal representation for children in child welfare
proceedings.47 Previously, the Child Welfare Policy Manual only allowed
42. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii). CAPTA defines child abuse as “any recent
act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious
physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act which
presents an imminent risk of serious harm.” CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111–320, § 142, 124 Stat. 3459, 3482 (2010).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii)(I)–(II).
44. See FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 328. Additionally, the Act sets
certain requirements for dependency proceedings. For example, courts must hold a review
hearing at least every six months to determine the child’s safety and the continuing
necessity and appropriateness of their placement. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B). The court must
hold a permanency hearing within twelve months of the child entering foster care, and
every twelve months thereafter. Id. § 675(5)(C). A child enters foster care when there is
either a judicial finding of child abuse or neglect or sixty days after the child was removed,
whichever is earlier. Id. § 675(5)(F). If the child has spent fifteen of the last twenty-two
months in state care, the parents have abandoned the child, or the parent has been found
guilty of specific listed offenses, the State must request a termination of parental rights
hearing. Id. § 675(5)(E).
45. See FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 329.
46. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c).
47. CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD WELFARE
POLICY MANUAL 296 (2021); John Kelly, In Major Reversal, Feds Will Now Help Pay
Child Welfare Legal Fees, THE IMPRINT (Dec. 20, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://imprintnews.org/
child-welfare-2/major-reversal-feds-pay-legal-fees-children-parents/33204 [https://perma.cc/
N8VR-35QL] (“A major barrier to funding legal representation in the child welfare system
was basically just eradicated . . . .”); Mark Hardin, Claiming Title IV-E Funds to Pay for
Parents’ and Children’s Attorneys: A Brief Technical Overview, A.B.A. (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_prac
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reimbursement for legal representation of child welfare agencies––not for
children or their parents.48
D. Indiana State Law
Under Indiana state law, courts may appoint a GAL, CASA, or both to
represent a child in a dependency proceeding.49 State law specifies that
the GAL does not need to be an attorney,50 and the only requirement is
that the GAL advocate for the best interest of the child.51 The only persons
entitled to legal representation in juvenile court are children charged with
a delinquent act and parents in “proceedings to terminate the parent-child
relationship.”52 Otherwise, courts may appoint counsel to represent a child in
any other proceeding.53 Courts may also appoint an attorney to represent the
GAL.54
E. Florida State Law
Under Florida state law, courts are only required to appoint legal counsel
for certain children in dependency proceedings. Children in dependency
cases shall be assigned an attorney ad litem if the child resides in, or is
being considered for placement in, a skilled nursing facility; is prescribed
ticeonline/january—december-2019/claiming-title-iv-e-funds-to-pay-for-parentsand-childrens-attor/ [https://perma.cc/59PD-KAY7]. Note that this policy change does not
provide funding for all children in the welfare system, only the children that qualify for
Title IV-E funding. Hardin, supra. Whether a child qualifies will depend on the
financial circumstances of the parent or relative that had custody of the child. Id. The
number of children who qualify varies from state to state and generally ranges from “less
than 25% to over 75%” of children in the welfare system. Id.
48. See C HILD .’ S B UREAU , supra note 47, at 296 (“[R]egulations at 45 CFR
1356.60(c) specify that Federal financial participation (FFP) is available at the rate of 50%
for administrative expenditures necessary for the proper and efficient administration of the
title IV-E plan.” (citing 45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c)). The administrative function specified at
45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c)(2)(ii), preparation for and participation in judicial determinations,
concerns the State agency’s representation but not the provision of legal services to a child
or parent. Id. at 277–78; see also 45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c)(2)(ii). Only the State agency’s
participation in judicial determinations is an allowable cost. CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note
47, at 277–78.
49. IND. CODE § 31-32-3-1(a) (2019) (“The juvenile court may appoint a guardian
ad litem or a court appointed special advocate, or both, for the child at any time.”).
50. Id. § 31-32-3-3 (“A guardian ad litem or court appointed special advocate need
not be an attorney. . . .”).
51. Id. § 31-32-3-6 (“A guardian ad litem or court appointed special advocate shall
represent and protect the best interests of the child.”).
52. Id. § 31-32-4-1.
53. Id. § 31-32-4-2(b).
54. Id. § 31-32-3-5 (“If necessary to protect the child’s interests, the court may appoint
an attorney to represent the guardian ad litem or the court appointed special advocate.”).
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a psychotropic medication but declines assent to the medication; has a
diagnosed developmental disability; is being placed in, or considered for
placement in, a residential treatment center; or is a victim of human
trafficking.55 Florida’s Rules of Juvenile Procedure also allow courts to
appoint an attorney to represent a child in any proceeding as permitted by
law.56 In addition to lay GALs and attorney GALs, Florida also has Child’s
Best Interest Attorneys (CBI), but they neither represent nor have a relationship
with the child.57 CBI attorneys are employed by Florida’s Guardian Ad
Litem Program to represent the individual GALs.58
Under Florida law, a GAL must provide courts with a written report of
their findings regarding the allegations in the petition, a statement of the
child’s wishes, and their recommendations.59 The Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure also specify that the duties of a lay GAL do not include the
practice of law.60 Additionally, parents are entitled to legal counsel in
dependency proceedings.61
Overall, dependency proceedings are subject to numerous state and
federal requirements. These proceedings can prove difficult for an adult
to navigate without legal counsel, much less a child.62 Additionally, courts
historically granted children minimal constitutional protections. However, in
the last fifty years, courts started to recognize children as rights-based
citizens.63

55. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3)(a)–(e) (2019).
56. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.217(b) (2020).
57. GUARDIAN AD LITEM, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS 7
(2015).
58. Id.; FLA. BAR STANDING COMM. ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILD., FLORIDA
GUIDELINES OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES 4 (2014).
59. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.215(c)(1) (2020).
60. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.215(f) (2020) (“The duties of lay guardians shall not include
the practice of law.”).
61. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2019) (“Parents must be informed by the court of their
right to counsel in dependency proceedings at each stage of the dependency proceedings.
Parents who are unable to afford counsel must be appointed counsel.”).
62. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30. The Court acknowledged that termination of
parental rights hearings are “not always simple, however commonplace they may be.” Id.
The proceedings may include expert medical and psychiatric testimony, and the parents
are likely to be uneducated. Id. These factors can overwhelm a parent who does not have
legal representation. Id.
63. See Marvin Ventrell, The Practice of Law for Children, 66 MONT. L. REV. 1, 3
(2005). See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing children’s constitutional
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III. THE HISTORY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
A brief review of the evolution of children’s constitutional rights
explains why some states continue to deny children the right to legal counsel
in dependency proceedings. The concept of parens patriae that underlies
the juvenile justice system has and continues to function as a doubleedged sword.
A. Pre-In re Gault
Marvin Ventrell, former president of the National Association of Counsel
for Children, described the evolution of children’s rights as a change from
“children as property, to children as welfare recipients, to children as
rights-based citizens.”64 While there is some truth to this characterization,
not all aspects of the juvenile justice system treat children as rights-based
citizens.
Prior to the nineteenth-century, children were considered the property
of their parents and had no right to government protections to prevent parental
abuse.65 The nineteenth-century marked the start of a reform movement,
known as the House of Refuge movement, aimed at saving children. 66
However, the first movement of the House of Refuge, the Society for
Prevention of Pauperism, was not concerned with rescuing children from
parental abuse, but rather from a life of crime.67 Reformers and the courts
justified this intrusion into children’s lives, and subsequently on parents’
property rights, using the English doctrine of parens patriae.68
Under parens patriae, the State protects those who cannot care for
themselves, like children.69 Essentially, the State steps in and assumes the
parental role in place of the child’s actual parents. As far as states were
concerned, all children living in poverty could potentially become criminals,
and therefore the State had the authority and the obligation to intervene

rights as separate from their parents), abrogated in part by Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364
(1986).
64. Ventrell, supra note 63, at 3.
65. Ventrell, supra note 63, at 4 (citing MARY EDNA HELFER, RUTH S. KEMPE &
RICHARD D. KRUGMAN, THE BATTERED CHILD 9, 11 (5th ed. 1997)); Ventrell, supra note
15, at 18; Malempati, supra note 2, at 183.
66. Ventrell, supra note 15, at 22 (noting the movement began with the Prevention
of Pauperism, which “believed that poverty was a cause, if not the primary cause, of crime
committed by children”); see also Amy E. Halbrook, Custody: Kids, Counsel and the
Constitution, DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 2016–2017, at 182.
67. Ventrell, supra note 15, at 22 (“There is no evidence that children were placed
[in the House of Refuge system] as a result of caretaker cruelty.”).
68. See id. at 23; Malempati, supra note 2, at 184; Halbrook, supra note 66, at 182.
69. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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on behalf of society.70 The concept of parens patriae would carry over
into the juvenile justice system.71
Starting in 1899, when Cook County, Illinois established the first juvenile
court, children’s legal status changed from children as property to children
as welfare recipients.72 Both society and the courts started viewing children
as fundamentally different from adults and in need of rehabilitation rather
than punishment.73 The juvenile justice system provided rehabilitation
and guidance to children under the doctrine of parens patriae.74 Unfortunately,
the courts also used the concept of parens patriae to deny children in the
juvenile system the procedural rights available to their adult counterparts.75
Under parens patriae, courts found formal procedures unnecessary and
instead operated as “process-less tribunals” in which judges exercised
broad discretion do to whatever they believed to be in the best interest of
the child.76 Naturally, the courts considered legal counsel for children
unnecessary and even disruptive to this informal process.77
To summarize, courts denied children their constitutional rights because
the state, acting under the doctrine of parens patriae, would act in the child’s
best interest. This ideology would dominate the juvenile justice system
until the Supreme Court case In re Gault.

70. Ventrell, supra note 15, at 23.
71. Malempati, supra note 2, at 184.
72. Ventrell, supra note 15, at 26; Ventrell, supra note 63, at 3. Almost every state
used this court as an example for their own juvenile justice systems. Ventrell, supra note
15, at 26.
73. Madison C. Jaros, The Double-Edged Sword of Parens Patriae: Status Offenders
and the Punitive Reach of the Juvenile Justice System, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2191
(2019).
74. Id.
75. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17 (“Gault’s sweeping statement that ‘our Constitution
guarantees that no person shall be “compelled” to be a witness against himself when he is
threatened with deprivation of his liberty,’ is plainly not good law.”).
76. Ventrell, supra note 63, at 11. This phenomenon can be attributed to children’s
lack of independent constitutional rights. The courts cannot violate an individual’s rights
if the individual has no rights to begin with. Once the Supreme Court recognized that
children have constitutional rights in In re Gault, procedural safeguards become necessary
to fair treatment.
77. Id. at 12.

727

58-3_ NEEDHAM_FINAL2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/8/2021 1:51 PM

B. In re Gault and Beyond
The Supreme Court finally recognized children’s constitutional rights
in the landmark case In re Gault.78 In In re Gault, police took a minor into
custody for allegedly making lewd phone calls to his neighbor.79 At the
hearing, the minor did not have legal counsel, and there was no transcript
or memorandum to record the substance of the proceedings.80 Thus, the
state court relied on its discretion, the disputed testimony of a probation
officer, and the minor’s parents.81 There was no cross-examination, and
the alleged victim did not appear in court or have any communication with
the judge.82 After just two hearings, the judge sentenced the minor, who
was fifteen at the time, to be committed to the Arizona State Industrial
School until he reached the age of twenty-one.83 The minor’s parents

78. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. Prior to In re Gault, the Court hinted at limiting
parens patriae. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). In Kent, the juvenile
was transferred to adult court without a hearing. Id. at 546. The judge made no findings
and did not provide a reason for the transfer. Id. The juvenile challenged the
constitutionality of the juvenile waiver. Id. at 552. The Court noted that parens patriae
was not “an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.” Id. at 555. Nevertheless, the Court
refused to grant children the same constitutional guarantees as adults. Id. at 556 (“This
concern, however, does not induce us in this case to accept the invitation to rule that
constitutional guaranties which would be applicable to adults charged with the serious
offenses for which Kent was tried must be applied in juvenile court proceedings concerned
with allegations of law violation.”).
79. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
80. Id. at 5. When this case was decided, only about one-third of the states had
statutes requiring legal representation for children in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Id. at 37–38. In contrast, two-thirds of jurisdictions currently provide legal counsel for
children in dependency proceedings. See FIRST STAR INST. & CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST.,
supra note 1, at 7.
81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 35. The lower court argued that parents and probation
officers would protect the child’s interest in court, so legal representation was unnecessary.
Id. The Court disagreed because probation officers serve as both arresting officers and
witnesses against children in adjudicatory hearings. Id. at 35–36. Due to this conflict of
roles, the probation officer cannot serve as the child’s counsel. Id. at 36.
There is arguably a similar issue when the child’s dependency proceeding representative
serves as both the attorney and GAL. See Malempati, supra note 13, at 110. The author
discusses how the attorney role requires giving a voice to the child’s position while
the GAL role requires advocating for the child’s best interest. Id. Requiring one individual
to fulfill both roles creates role confusion and ultimately leads to ineffective lawyering on
behalf of children. Id.
Additionally, judges cannot adequately protect the child’s liberty interests. As is the
case with all judicial proceedings, a judge cannot play the role of advocate and impartial
arbitrator. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36; Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of
Whether Young Children in Child Protection Proceedings Should Be Represented by Lawyers,
32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 54 (2000).
82. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 7.
83. Id.
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subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the minor
was entitled to legal counsel at the hearing under the Due Process Clause.84
The Supreme Court held that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”85 Additionally, the Court’s holding
made two significant changes to the juvenile delinquency system. First,
the Court finally restricted the previously unlimited power of parens patriae.
The Court recognized that “unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”86
The Court acknowledged the unique features of the juvenile justice system
that classify juveniles as “delinquent” rather than “criminals” could coexist
with constitutional principles.87 Second, the Court bifurcated the juvenile
justice system.88 The Court was careful to limit the right to counsel to children
in delinquency cases.89
However, the time has come for children in dependency proceedings to
be given the same protections as their delinquency counterparts. It is a
grave injustice that a child in juvenile court facing a week of incarceration
or simply conditions of probation is entitled to legal counsel, but a child
in a dependency court who may spend eighteen years in the foster care
system moving from placement to placement is not. Foster children are
84. Id. at 10. In addition to the right to counsel, the parents also asserted the right
to notice of charges, the right to confrontation and cross-examination, the privilege against
self-incrimination, the right to a transcript of the proceedings, and the right to appellate
review. Id.
85. Id. at 13.
86. Id. at 18. One critical factor in the Court’s imposition of basic due process is
its role in ascertaining the truth on a question of serious import, involuntary state sanctions.
See id. at 20. Hence, the right to notice, present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, have
attorney representation, have a transcript, and appeal were imposed nationally as a ground
floor. See id. at 27–28.
87. Id. at 22. Specifically, the Court found no reason why requiring due process
would impair the juvenile courts’ ability to treat juvenile offenders separate from adults,
continue to classify children as “juveniles” rather than “criminals,” or keep juvenile information
confidential. Id. at 22–25.
88. Originally, the courts did not distinguish between dependency and delinquency
cases. Ventrell, supra note 63, at 14.
89. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 41 (“We do not in this opinion consider the impact
of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and
the state.”). However, despite the Court’s holding, many children in the juvenile system
receive inadequate representation. N. Lee Cooper, Patricia Puritz & Wendy Shang, Fulfilling
the Promise of In Re Gault: Advancing the Role of Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 651, 660 (1998). Some factors that may contribute to this issue are judicia l
encouragement to waive the right to counsel, lack of training, and high caseloads. Id. at
661–62.
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also subject to state control, with a judge serving as their legal parents and
deciding every detail of their life: who their parents will be, where they
will live, whom they may see, and what school they will attend.90 The
judge also has the discretion to place the child in a group-home setting,
where they could potentially face the same level of restricted freedom as
the minor in In re Gault would face in a state industrial school.91
Denying children legal representation also mischaracterizes the nature
of dependency proceedings. Dependency proceedings are not merely the
parent versus the State. This view treats the child as chattel for both parties
to fight for control of, a belief that In re Gault rejected.92 Rather, dependency
proceedings are a dispute between the parent, the State, and the child.
Each has a similar but independent interest in the outcome.93
The court should not assume that the child’s interests align with the
interests of the parent and the State. Children may or may not want to
return to the custody of their alleged abuser, and the court cannot assume
that a parent accused of abuse or neglect will act in the child’s best
interest.94 Courts may assume that states are acting in the best interest of
the child, but the State and the child may disagree about what actions are
truly in the child’s best interest. If the justice system is premised on the
idea that the “truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions
and conflicting data[,]”95 then all three of these parties require adequate
legal representation to advocate for their respective interests. Otherwise,
judges cannot make fully informed decisions on what is in the best interest
of the child.
IV. IS THERE A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES?
Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, states cannot
deprive an individual of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of

90. See FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 328; Malempati, supra note 2, at
189 (citing DONALD N. DUQUETTE & ANN M. HARALAMBIE, CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE 357 (2d ed. 2010)).
91. See infra Section V.A (discussing how group home placements restrict children’s
physical liberty).
92. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13 (holding that children are persons protected by
the Constitution).
93.
Several courts have recognized that children have a separate interest apart from
the state and their parents. See Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga.
2005) (recognizing children’s liberty interest in their own safety and wellbeing and in family
integrity); In re Dependency of M.S.R., 271 P.3d 234, 243 (Wash. 2012) (finding that
children have liberty interests in dependency proceedings that are different from, but “at
least as great as . . . the parent’s”).
94. Mandelbaum, supra note 81, at 56.
95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21; see also Mandelbaum, supra note 81, at 28.
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law . . . .”96 In some cases applicable to children, such as In re Gault, due
process of law requires the appointment of legal counsel.97 The Supreme
Court has never addressed the issue of children’s due process right to legal
counsel in dependency proceedings.98 However, several cases have discussed
the underlying principles.
A. Mathews v. Eldridge
In Mathews, the Supreme Court laid out the test for analyzing due
process violations. 99 The plaintiff argued that the Due Process Clause
required an evidentiary hearing before termination of Social Security
disability benefits.100 After reviewing its own precedents, the Court concluded
that due process compliance requires consideration of three factors: (1)
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”101 Subsequent Supreme
Court cases have added to these factors.
B. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services
The Supreme Court case Lassiter v. Department of Social Services is
relevant to the issue of children’s right to counsel in dependency proceedings.
The case added a new element to the Mathews analysis for civil cases
involving a right to counsel, known as the Lassiter presumption.102
In Lassiter, the Court terminated a mother’s parental rights because she
had not seen or expressed any concern for the child in several years.103
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
97. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
98. Halbrook, supra note 66, at 180.
99. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
100. Id. at 325.
101. Id. at 335.
102. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27; Malempati, supra note 2, at 211–12; Lewis
Tandy, Note, Reevaluating the Path to a Constitutional Right to Appointed Counsel
for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 96 TEX. L. REV. 653, 661 (2018).
103. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 23–24. At the time of the termination of parental rights
hearing, Ms. Lassiter was serving a twenty-five to forty-year sentence for second-degree
murder. Id. at 20.
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The mother appealed, claiming that as an indigent parent, she was entitled
to legal counsel at the termination of parental rights hearing under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.104 Before analyzing the Mathews
factors, the Court concluded, based on precedent, that an “indigent litigant
has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived
of his physical liberty.”105 Therefore, under the Lassiter presumption, courts
may presume litigants who are not at risk of losing their physical liberty
do not require appointed counsel.106 Courts must analyze the three Mathews
factors and set their net weight against this presumption.107
In its Mathews analysis, the Court recognized that parents in termination
of parental rights proceedings have an extremely important interest in
family integrity.108 The State shares the parent’s interest in an accurate
and just decision, and also has a relatively weak pecuniary interest. 109
Additionally, the complexity of the proceedings and the incapacity of
uncounseled parents could, in some cases, make the risk of erroneous
deprivation high.110 Therefore, the Lassiter presumption can be overcome
when the parent’s interest is at its strongest, the State interest is at its weakest,
and the risk of erroneous deprivation is high.111 However, the Due Process
Clause does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in
all termination of parental rights proceedings.112
1. Kenny A. v. Perdue
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia is
the only federal court to find that children have a constitutional right to
appointed legal counsel.113 The court held in Kenny A. v. Perdue that foster
children in dependency proceedings are at risk of losing their physical
liberty and that the Mathews factors favor the appointment of legal counsel.114
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id. at 26–27.
106. Id.; Tandy, supra note 102, at 661.
107. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 31. The Court highlights that many parents will likely be uneducated and
have faced “uncommon difficulty in dealing with life.” Id. at 30. Furthermore, forcing
parents into disorienting legal proceedings can overwhelm them and impede their ability
to represent themselves. See id.
111. Id. at 31.
112. Id. Despite its ruling, the Court concedes that appointing counsel for parents in
dependency proceedings is “wise public policy . . . .” Id. at 33–34. In fact, the Court seems
to imply that the states already providing legal counsel for indigent parents should continue
to do so despite their holding. Id. at 34.
113. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
114. See id. at 1360–61.
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Unfortunately, this case is only binding in the Northern District of Georgia.115
Other courts, like the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, consistently
hold that children in dependency proceedings do not have a per se right to
appointed legal counsel.116 However, these courts fail to consider the
significance of the child’s interest and the higher risk of erroneous deprivation
children face when compared to adults.117

115. The case was based on a complaint of violation of the Georgia Constitution. Id.
at 1355. However, the court’s reasoning focused on federal cases and principles. Id. at
1360. First, the court pointed out that children have due process rights under both the Due
Process Clause and the Georgia Constitution, which use identical language. See id. at
1359; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1. Second, the court applied
the Mathews analysis. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1360–61. Therefore, the case is applicable
to federal due process analyses.
116. See In re Dependency of M.S.R., 271 P.3d 234, 245 (Wash. 2012) (“We hold
the due process right of children who are subjects of dependency or termination proceedings to
counsel is not universal.”); In re Dependency of E.H., 427 P.3d 587, 598 (Wash. 2018)
(“Under both the state and federal constitutions, the discretionary standard for appointment
of counsel [under Washington state law] p rovides children with sufficient due process
protection . . . .”).
117. In the case of In re Dependency of M.S.R., the court held that children’s liberty
interest in dependency proceedings are “at least as great as[] the parent’s.” 271 P.3d at 243.
This view fails to adequately account for the physical and emotional risks that children
face in the foster care system. By the court’s own admission, children depend on others
“to provide for their basic needs.” Id. at 242. The parent faces the unimaginable loss of
their child, but the child loses everything. The child is taken away from their home, family,
friends and possibly school to go live with strangers. See How Does The Foster Care
System Work?, IFOSTER, https://www.ifoster.org/how-does-the-foster-care-system-work/
[https://perma.cc/6JQJ-JJSB]. This is a much greater liberty interest than that of the parent.
The court also raises the issue of infant children. In re Dependency of M.S.R., 271 P.3d
at 245. A child who is non-verbal would not be able to communicate with an attorney, so
they would not benefit from the added protection of counsel. Id. However, there is an
alternative model of representation for non-verbal clients. See Lisa Kelly & Alicia LeVezu,
Until the Client Speaks: Reviving the Legal-Interest Model for Preverbal Children,
50 FAM. L.Q. 383, 385 (2016). The authors discuss an alternative to the best-interest and
substituted-judgment models, known as legal-interest advocacy. Id. Legal-interest advocacy
requires the attorney to ensure that the child’s legal rights are protected until the child is
able to express their desires. Id. For example, children have a statutory right to be placed
with relatives that meet certain standards instead of a non-related caregiver. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 671(a)(19). Imagine the parents of a one-month-old child are considering relinquishing
their parental rights. The child is currently living with a foster family that wants to adopt
her, but the social worker identified a relative that is able to take her in. A best-interest
attorney might advocate for keeping the child with her foster family if they believe it is
the best placement for her. See Kelly & LeVezu, supra note 117, at 400. However,
a legal-interest attorney would have to look only at the rights the child is entitled to, such
as reunification with her family and placement with a relative. Id. at 401. In doing so, the
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V. WHY CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT
Securing appointed legal counsel in civil cases is an uphill battle, but
children in the dependency system are different from their adult counterparts.
Not only do children in dependency proceedings overcome the Lassiter
presumption, but the Mathews factors also strongly weigh in favor of
providing legal counsel.
A. The Lassiter Presumption
The Lassiter presumption is the bane of securing a civil right to counsel
for children in dependency proceedings.118 Under the Lassiter presumption,
the courts may presume that when a litigant is not at risk of losing their
physical liberty, they do not require appointed legal counsel.119 While the
Mathews factors can rebut this presumption, courts often refuse to grant
the right to legal counsel when there is no potential loss of physical liberty.120
Foster children in dependency proceedings, unlike most parties in civil
litigation, do face the potential loss of physical liberty as required to overcome
the Lassiter presumption.121 The judge may place foster children in a variety
of settings while they wait to be reunified with their parents or adopted.122
Possible placements include approved relatives, foster family care providers,
foster care agencies, or institutional group homes.123 Approximately fiftyfive thousand children, or 13% of all foster children, are in institutional

attorney would be protecting the child’s liberty interest in family integrity. Therefore,
attorneys are necessary even in cases pertaining to nonverbal children.
118. Tandy, supra note 102, at 661. The author highlights the difficulty of overcoming
the Lassiter presumption in other types of proceedings, specifically immigration hearings
for unaccompanied, undocumented children. Id. at 659–60. Undocumented children in
deportation hearings cannot overcome the Lassiter presumption because the outcome of
the hearing is not considered a deprivation of physical liberty. Id. at 666. Rather, the
outcome of a deportation proceeding is whether the child is allowed to live freely in the
United States or gets deported. Id. at 666–67.
119. Id. at 661; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27 (“[T]he Court’s precedents speak with
one voice about what ‘fundamental fairness’ has meant when the Court has considered the
right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an indigent
litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his
physical liberty.”).
120. Tandy, supra note 102, at 661, 663.
121. Malempati, supra note 2, at 212.
122. See FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 328.
123. See id. Many foster children will experience multiple placements. Id. at 337.
Child advocates refer to these repeated placement changes as “foster care drift.” Id. On
average, children in long term foster care (at least thirty-six consecutive months in foster
care) have five different placements, while children in short term foster care have three.
Id. One potential consequence of foster care drift is “detachment syndrome.” Id.
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group homes, also known as “congregate care.”124 Congregate care refers
to licensed group homes providing twenty-four-hour care for seven to twelve
children, and licensed institutions providing twenty-four-hour care for
twelve or more children such as child care institutions, residential treatment
facilities, and maternity homes.125 Such placements are considered more
restrictive than a typical home-like foster placement.126 Of course, children
with specific needs can benefit from the increased supervision and structure
of congregate care.127 However, a 2015 executive summary published by
the Children’s Bureau found that 40% of children in group homes had no
clinical indicators that would justify such placement.128 Essentially, there
were thousands of children in highly restrictive placements for no justifiable
reason.
Placement in congregate care is analogous to two types of placements
the Supreme Court considers a loss of physical liberty for children. First,
the Court in In re Gault held that placing the minor in a State “Industrial
School”––a juvenile detention facility––would be considered in state
custody and away from his friends and family, and therefore constituted a
loss of physical liberty.129 Second, the Court held in Parham v. J.R.130 that
children, like their adult counterparts, have a substantial liberty interest in not
being “confined unnecessarily for medical treatment . . . .”131 Therefore,

124. See Congregate Care, Residential Treatment and Group Home State Legislative
Enactments 2014-2019, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 30, 2020), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/congregate-care-and-group-home-state-legislativeenactments.aspx [https://perma.cc/3T7H-Q33G].
125. CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., A NATIONAL LOOK
AT THE USE OF CONGREGATE CARE IN CHILD WELFARE 1 (2015).
126. See Mary Dozier et al., Consensus Statement on Group Care For Children and
Adolescents: A Statement of Policy of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, 84 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 219, 219 (2014); NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note
124.
127. Claire Chiamulera, Reducing Congregate Care Placements: Strategies for Judges
and Attorneys, A.B.A. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/
child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/january-december-2018/reducing-congregatecare-placements—strategies-for-judges-and-a/ [https://perma.cc/T8GH-4BYK].
Congregate care is appropriate for children with extreme mental health needs and addiction
issues. Id.
128. CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note 125, at 7.
129. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
130. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
131. Id. at 600. The plaintiffs filed the action on behalf of children receiving
treatment in Georgia state mental health facilities to challenge the commitment procedures
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the civil commitment of a child to a mental health facility is a loss of
physical liberty.132 Congregate care is similar to both of these placements
because the child is taken away from their home and confined to a highly
regulated institution run by state actors. For this reason, placement in
congregate care should also be considered a loss of physical liberty as
required by the Mathews presumption.
Because foster children risk losing their physical liberty if the judge
determines that they cannot return to their parents, the Lassiter presumption
does not weigh against appointing legal counsel.133 However, as the Court
clarified in Turner v. Rogers, potential deprivation of an individual’s physical
liberty is necessary but not sufficient for the court to grant the right to
legal counsel.134 Therefore, the Mathews factors must also weigh in favor
of foster children’s right to appointed counsel.
B. Mathews Due Process Analysis
A procedural due process challenge requires a two-step inquiry.135
First, courts must determine whether the individual bringing the claim has
for persons under eighteen. Id. at 587. Specifically, child advocates argued that due
process required that there be an adversary proceeding prior to commitment. Id. at 602.
132. See id. at 600–01. Despite finding that children had a liberty interest in freedom
from bodily restraint and freedom from the “emotional and psychic harm” caused by
institutionalization, the Court refused to require a hearing before an impartial tribunal prior
to a child’s commitment to a mental health facility. Id. at 597, 620.
In the dissent by Justice Brennan, he argues that children should receive the same, if not
more, pre-commitment safeguards as their adult counterparts. Id. at 627 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan cites to the documented inadequacies of children’s mental health
facilities, the inherent uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, and psychiatrist’s tendency
to err on the side of caution to highlight the risk of erroneous commitment. Id. at 628–29.
In order to avoid delaying treatment, Justice Brennan suggests postponing the hearing. Id.
at 633.
133. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27.
134. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 443 (2011). Turner claimed that he was
entitled to counsel at his civil contempt proceeding because he faced potential incarceration.
Id. at 435. In prior decisions, the Court only granted the right to counsel in cases involving
potential incarceration, but the right to counsel did not exist in all such cases. Id. at 443.
Any other interpretation would conflict with its holding in Gagnon v. Scarpelli. Id.; Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–90 (1973) (holding that criminal offenders facing revocation
of probation and imprisonment do not have a categorical right to counsel at probation
revocation hearings).
135. See Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 90 (2015) (“The first question that we must ask,
then, is whether the denial . . . deprived [defendant] of any [life, liberty, or property] interests.
Only if we answer in the affirmative must we proceed to consider whether the Government’s
explanation afforded sufficient process.”); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S.
40, 59 (1999) (“The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff
has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’ . . . Only after finding
the deprivation of a protected interest do we look to see if the State’s procedures comport
with due process.”).
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a life, liberty, or property interest at stake in the proceedings.136 Without
a life, liberty, or property interest, there is no Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process claim.137 Second, courts must determine what procedures the Due
Process Clause requires.138 This second step requires courts to apply the
Mathews balancing test discussed above.139 As to the first step, foster children
have three liberty interests at stake in dependency proceedings: family integrity,
health and safety, and freedom from bodily restraint.140
1. Liberty Interests
a. Right to Family Integrity
Dependency proceedings threaten a child’s liberty interest in preserving
family integrity. According to the Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause protects matters of family life.141 However, the Court
never ruled that children have a liberty interest in preserving family
integrity.142 Nevertheless, the right to family integrity for parents creates
136. See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 59; Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005).
137. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224 (“We need reach the question of what process
is due only if the [defendants] establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest, so it is
appropriate to address this threshold question at the outset.”).
138. See id. (“A liberty interest having been established, we turn to the question of
what process is due . . . .”).
139. See supra Section IV.A; see also Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224–28 (applying the
Mathews analysis to determine if the new prison policy that classifies prisoners for placement
at a Supermax facility satisfied due process).
140. See Jacob Ethan Smiles, Comment, A Child’s Due Process Right to Legal Counsel
in Abuse and Neglect Dependency Proceedings, 37 FAM. L.Q. 485, 493–94 (2003). Liberty
interests arise from the Constitution, “guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’” and from
expectations or interests created by state laws or policies. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221.
141. See, e.g., Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (reiterating a parent’s rights to the “companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children” (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972))); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1976)
(“[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life is one of the liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause . . . . “); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing
the essential right to “establish a home and bring up children”); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” ).
142. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“While
this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child’s liberty interests in
preserving established familial or family-like bonds, . . . it seems to me extremely likely that, to
the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests . . . .”).
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an equivalent right to family integrity for children. After all, children are
part of the very family the Court has vigorously and repeatedly held to be
within the protection of the Constitution,143 and the Court has already
recognized that children have individual liberty interests protected by the
Constitution.144 If the parent has the right to “companionship, care, custody,
and management”145 of their child, does this not create an equal right for
the child to have the companionship and care of the parent? To be under
the custody and management of the parent? To say that the Court does
not treats the child like chattel, which is a paradigm the Court shifted away
from in In re Gault.146 Courts cannot protect children’s rights without first
acknowledging that such rights exist.
Furthermore, state and lower federal courts have already recognized the
individual liberty interest of children in preserving family integrity.147 In Kenny
A. v. Perdue and In re Dependency of M.S.R., courts recognized children have
a liberty interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, as well as preserving
their relationship with other family members, such as siblings, grandparents,
and extended family.148
Lastly, Congress acknowledged a child’s interest in family integrity through
its child protection policies. First, there is a preference for either keeping
the child with parents or placing them with family whenever possible.149
Second, in 2008, Congress passed the Fostering Connections to Success and

143. See cases cited supra note 141.
144. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13 (“[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone.”), abrogated in part by Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372
(1986).
145. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
146. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. The Court provides an overview of how the
juvenile justice system evolved. Id. at 16–17. When discussing the doctrine of parens
patriae, the Court notes that the common conception of the court and advocates was that
children had a right to custody, not liberty. Id. at 17. To put it another way, the only right
children had was the right to have someone take care of them. See id. Therefore, state
intervention does not deprive a child of any procedural or constitutional rights because he
or she has none. Id. The Court found these theoretical principles debatable and highlights
the inherent danger of bypassing due process. Id. at 17–20. In doing so, the Court rejects
the idea that children are chattel to be passed around from parent to state. Instead, they
are individuals with rights who cannot be overlooked based on the archaic notion of parens
patriae. See id. at 20.
147. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1360; In re Dependency of M.S.R., 271 P.3d at
242–43.
148. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (recognizing children have a fundamental
liberty interest in “maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a relationship
with his or her biological parents”); In re Dependency of M.S.R., 271 P.3d at 242
(acknowledging that children are also at risk of losing their relationship with siblings,
grandparents, aunts, uncles and other extended family).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(B) (requiring that states make reasonable efforts to preserve
and reunify families).
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Increasing Adoptions Act which requires states receiving federal funding
to make reasonable efforts to place siblings together or, if siblings are
separated, to provide for frequent visitation and ongoing contact.150 Lastly,
in 2018, Congress passed the Family First Prevention Services Act allowing
states to exceed the number of foster children allowed in a home in order
to keep siblings together.151 Taken all together, these policies show how
Congress has recognized children’s interest in maintaining family integrity
that is separate from their parent’s interest. Therefore, children have a liberty
interest in family integrity that is both recognized by various courts and supported
by acts of Congress that trigger a procedural due process analysis.
b. Right to Health and Safety
Dependency proceedings also threaten a child’s liberty interest in physical
and emotional safety. The Supreme Court ruled that children do not have
a constitutional right to state intervention to protect them from their parents.152
However, by choosing to interfere with the parent-child relationship—and
thereby taking custody of the child—the State creates a “special relationship”
with the child that entitles them to protection.153
In Deshaney v. Winnebago, social services investigated reports that Joshua
Deshaney’s father was abusing him, but the evidence was insufficient to

150. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No 110–351, 122 Stat. 3949 (“[R]easonable efforts shall be made . . . to place siblings
removed from their home in the same foster care, kinship guardianship, or adoptive
placement, unless the State documents that such a joint placement would be contrary to
the safety or well-being of any of the siblings; and . . . in the case of siblings removed from
their home who are not so jointly placed, to provide for frequent visitation or other ongoing
interaction between the siblings, unless that State documents that frequent visitation or
other ongoing interaction would be contrary to the safety or well -being of any of
the siblings.”); CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY , U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
SIBLING ISSUES IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION 5 (2019).
151. Family First Prevention Services Act of 2018, Pub. L. No 115–123, 132 Stat.
256 (“The number of foster children that may be cared for in a home under subparagraph
(A) may exceed the numerical limitation in subparagraph (A)(ii)(III), at the option of the
State, for any of the following reasons . . . [t]o allow siblings to remain together.”); CHILD
WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 150, at 3.
152. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
153. In re Dependency of M.S.R., 271 P.3d at 243 (reiterating that children have no
constitutional right to state intervention to protect them from harm until the State decides to
intervene); Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (recognizing that once children are in state
custody a “special relationship” is created that “gives rise to rights to reasonable safety”).
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bring Joshua under court custody.154 The abuse continued until the father
beat four-year-old Joshua so severely it caused permanent brain damage.155
Joshua’s mother sued the social services department claiming they deprived
Joshua of his liberty without due process of law when they all failed to
protect him from his father’s abuse.156
The Court found that the State had no affirmative duty to protect Joshua
under the Due Process Clause.157 Joshua fell outside of the Estelle-Youngberg
analysis because he was not harmed in state custody, nor was his father a
state actor.158 The Court acknowledged in a footnote that if the State had
removed Joshua and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, then
there may have been an affirmative duty to act.159 The Court also acknowledged
that several courts had held that the Estelle-Youngberg analysis applies to
foster children, but it refused to comment on the validity of such analysis.160
Under the Estelle-Youngberg analysis, states have an affirmative duty
to ensure the safety and general well-being of prisoners and those involuntarily
committed.161 The right to personal security is a “historic liberty interest”
under the Due Process Clause that cannot be extinguished even by lawful
confinement.162 A duty arises when states restrain the individual’s freedom
154. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
155. Id. at 193.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 201 (“While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render
him any more vulnerable to them. . . . Under these circumstances, the State had no
constitutional duty to protect Joshua.”).
158. Id. However, the State may have acquired a duty under state tort law by
voluntarily choosing to protect Joshua from a harm they did not create. Id. at 201–02. The
Court did not address this issue because the plaintiff’s claims were based solely on the
Due Process Clause. See id. at 202.
159. See id. at 201 n.9 (“Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed
Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might
have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise
to an affirmative duty to protect.”).
160. See id. Both the Second and Eleventh Circuit have acknowledged that the
Estelle-Youngberg analysis could apply to foster children. See Taylor v. Ledbetter,
818 F.2d 791, 794–97 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The liberty interests in this case is analogous to
the liberty interest in Youngberg. . . . [I]f foster parents with whom the state places a child
injure the child, and that injury results from state action or inaction, a balancing of interest
may show a deprivation of liberty.”); Doe v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134,
141 (2d Cir. 1981) (“When individuals are placed in custody or under the care of the
government, their governmental custodians are sometimes charged with affirmative duties, the
nonfeasance of which may violate the constitution.”).
161. See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 198–99.
162. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (citing Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)). Nicholas Romeo was severely mentally impaired. Id. at 309.
When his mother could no longer care for him, she put him in a state facility. Id. However,
Nicholas sustained numerous injuries both from his own actions and from other residents.
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through “incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty . . . .”163 State intervention through the dependency proceedings
restrains a child’s personal liberty by removing them from their home and
placing them in a foster care setting from which, short of running away,
they cannot leave.164 If a State has a duty to ensure the safety of prisoners
in its custody, then it should also have a duty to children—who have done
nothing wrong—in its custody.165 Both groups are removed from their
daily lives by state action and placed in environments regulated by state
actors.
c. Right to be Free from Bodily Restraint
Lastly, dependency proceedings threaten a child’s right to be free from
bodily restraint. The right to be free “‘from bodily restraint[]’ lies ‘at the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’”166 The most
obvious restriction is placement in an institution or group home that provides
twenty-four-hour care for children in a structured environment. 167 As
discussed in the Lassiter presumption, the Court in In re Gault found it
irrelevant that the juvenile was being sent to a “receiving home” rather
than a traditional prison because he was still taken away from his family

Id. at 310. His mother sued the facility officials, claiming they violated Nicholas’s Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to ensure his well-being. Id. The Court held
that Nicholas had a liberty interest in “personal security” and freedom from bodily restraint. Id.
at 316.
163. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added).
164. See generally Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected”
Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of
Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976).
165. Know Your Rights: Prisoners’ Rights, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/know-yourrights/prisoners-rights/ [https://perma.cc/9KRB-TVDW ]; Prisoners’ Rights, CORNELL L.
SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners%27_rights [https://perma.cc/2EXQ-QCTH];
Rudy Estrada & Jody Marksamer, The Legal Rights of Young People in State Custody:
What Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Professionals Need to Know When Working with
LGBT Youth, CHILD WELFARE, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 179–82.
166. Turner, 564 U.S. at 445 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
See also, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Youngberg,
457 U.S. at 316; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673–74.
167. See supra Section V.A.
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and friends and physically confined to state custody.168 Hence, any “institution
of confinement” would constitute bodily restraint.169
These three liberty interests trigger a due process analysis. After
establishing that there are liberty interests at stake, the next inquiry is what
procedure due process requires.170 An analysis of the three-prong Mathews
balancing test determines if the factors weigh in favor of appointed legal
counsel.
2. Mathews Balancing Test
a. The Private Interest That Will Be Affected by the Official Action
The first prong of the Mathews balancing test is the private interest that
will be affected by the dependency proceedings.171 The private interests
affected are the same three liberty interests that triggered due process: family
integrity, health and safety, and freedom from bodily restraint.172
Dependency proceedings threaten family integrity by separating children
from their family and friends.173 If the State files for a termination of parental
rights hearing, the parent could lose custody of the child permanently.174
For this reason, the child’s interest in family integrity deserves substantial
weight.
Additionally, the foster care system is a threat to children’s health and
safety in two ways.175 First, if courts erroneously determine that the
child does not need to be removed from the family, or erroneously returns
the child to their parent’s custody, the child is at risk of suffering further
168. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
169. See id. The Washington Supreme Court even suggested that any physical
removal of the child from the parents is an afront to physical liberty because the child becomes
a ward of the State, and parents have no say in their future placements. In re Dependency
of M.S.R., 271 P.3d at 242.
170. See supra Section V.B.
171. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
172. See Smiles, supra note 140, at 493–94; Turner, 564 U.S. at 445.
173. See, e.g., Vivek Sankaran, Christopher Church & Monique Mitchell, A Cure
Worse Than the Disease? The Impact of Removal on Children and Their Families, 102
MARQ. L. REV. 1161, 1165–66 (2019).
174. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
175. This Comment focuses on the physical and mental abuse that children may face
in foster care. However, some child advocates also believe the court system itself can
further traumatize children by mimicking the dynamic of an abusive relationship through
“rejection, degradation, and isolation.” Alicia LeVezu, Alone and Ignored: Children Without
Advocacy in Child Abuse and Neglect Courts, 14 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 125,
131 (2018) (citing Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of
State Intervention, 113 HARV . L. REV. 550, 587 (1999)). Giving children a voice and
empowering them in court can have a therapeutic effect. Id. Requiring legal counsel that
has to listen to and advocate for the child’s opinion is one way to empower them.
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abuse and neglect.176 Second, if courts remove the child and place them
in an unsafe foster placement, the child is also at risk of further abuse and
neglect.177
Lastly, as discussed above, children may be placed in a wide range of
settings, including restrictive group homes that severely limit their physical
freedom.178 With these important liberty interests in mind, the next step
in the Mathews balancing test is to determine if a lay GAL is sufficient to
protect these interests, or if guaranteed legal counsel would provide further
safeguards.179
b. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Such Interest Through the
Procedures Used, and the Probable Value, if Any, of
Additional or Substitute Procedural Safeguards
The second prong of the Mathews balancing test requires courts to analyze
whether the current procedures are sufficient to protect the important interests
identified in the first prong, or if additional safeguards are necessary.180
The Court stated in Mathews that procedural “due process rules are shaped
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the
generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”181 Therefore, Indiana and Florida’s
GAL procedures are insufficient to protect children’s liberty interests in
family integrity, health and safety, and freedom from bodily restraint
generally.182
As an initial matter, there is a significant risk that a court will make
erroneous decisions during dependency proceedings. Courts must determine

176. See Malempati, supra note 2, at 209; infra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.
177. According to the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS),
in 2018, an estimated 1,770 children died as a result of abuse or neglect from their parent
or primary caregiver. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILD.’S BUREAU, CHILD ABUSE
AND N EGLECT F ATALITIES 2018: S TATISTICS AND I NTERVENTIONS 2 (2020). This is an
11.3% increase from 2014. Id. Of these 1,770 deaths, 80.3% were perpetrated by parents,
14.6% by nonparents, including foster care providers, and 5.1% by unknown perpetrators.
Id. at 5. Sadly, this number underrepresents the true number of child deaths due to variance
in state reporting system, inaccurate determinations of death, and lack of coordination
among state agencies. Id. at 2–3.
178. See supra Section V.A.
179. See supra Section IV.A.
180. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
181. Id. at 344.
182. See FIRST STAR INST. & CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., supra note 1, at 62, 74 (grading
Florida’s GAL procedures a “C” and Indiana’s GAL procedures an “F”).
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what actions would be in the best interest of the child, which is a
subjective standard that can lend itself to abuse.183 The Supreme Court
recognized in Santosky v. Kramer that termination of parental rights hearings
require judges to make subjective determinations on what would be in the
best interest of the child, and such subjective determinations “magnify the
risk of erroneous fact-finding.”184 Such erroneous decisions can have dire
consequences. For example, in Indiana, a foster mother was charged with
the murder of the twenty-one-month-old girl in her care.185 Additionally,
a mother in Florida murdered her two-year-old son, who was erroneously
returned to her after she lied about completing her counseling program.186
Given the potential danger to children that stems from erroneous decisions
in dependency proceedings, it is crucial that courts are well informed about
the child’s circumstances, liberty interests, and desires in order to act in
the child’s best interest. Why is a lay GAL not sufficient to protect the
child in these cases? In Indiana and Florida, both the State and the parents
will have their own attorney.187 This puts the child with a lay GAL at a
severe disadvantage; attorneys have better legal training and must follow
the rules of ethics.188 A Washington study found that children in dependency
proceedings that were represented by a stated-interest attorney, rather than
a best-interest advocate such as a CASA, were more likely to receive

183. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762
(1982); Malempati, supra note 2, at 209.
184. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762. There are several factors that increase the risk of
erroneous factfinding in termination of parental rights proceedings. Id. First, courts possess an
unusual amount of discretion to weigh the facts. See id. Second, the parents will likely
be poor, uneducated minorities, which makes the proceedings vulnerable to cultural
or class bias. Id. at 763. Third, the State is much better suited to assemble a case against
the parent than the parent is to mount a defense. Id. The State has access to funding,
experts, and public records. Id. Additionally, the primary witnesses will likely be state
employees. Id.
185. Foster Mother Charged in Toddler’s Death in Gary, ABC 7 CHI. (May 7, 2017),
https://abc7chicago.com/news/foster-mother-charged-in-toddlers-death-in-gary/1962789/
[https://perma.cc/5DLP-8HRB]. The child’s biological mother expressed her concern to
the court after noticing bruises on her other three children who were in the same foster
house, but the court did nothing to protect them. Id.
186. Christopher O’Donnell, Foster Care Failures Uncovered in Death of 2-YearOld Jordan Belliveau, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/
news/publicsafety/foster-care-failures-identified-in-state-report-on-the-death-of-2-yearold-largo-boy-20190116/ [https://perma.cc/Z5NK-S3G6].
187. IND. CODE § 31-32-2-5 (2019) (“A parent is entitled to representation by counsel
in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship.”); FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.515(a)(1)
(2020) (“At each hearing, the court shall advise unrepresented parents of their right to have
counsel present . . . .”).
188. See Malempati, supra note 2, at 194; FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at
342. In contrast, Florida only requires a background check and thirty hours of precertification training to be certified as a GAL. GUARDIAN AD LITEM, supra note 57, at 11.
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“active representation.” 189 Overall, children were more likely to be
mentioned, have their well-being discussed, their preferences relayed and
argued for, and were present at hearings more often than children with lay
advocates.190 Additionally, the American Bar Association recommends that
children in dependency proceeding receive “quality legal representation”
and acknowledges that a best-interest advocate is not a valid substitute for
a trained attorney.191
Other provisions in Indiana and Florida state laws do not rectify the
representational imbalance that results from denying children legal counsel.
The fact that Florida and Indiana may provide the GALs an attorney does
not protect the child’s liberty interest.192 This is especially apparent in
termination of parental rights hearings.193 For example, imagine a case in
which the child wants to reunite with their parent, but the GAL feels that
termination of parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. In
Florida, the GAL has to make courts aware of the child’s wishes but can
disagree and advocate for the opposite.194 Even if the GAL did agree with

189. LeVezu, supra note 175, at 161. For the purpose of this Comment, Washington
is considered a category two state. See FIRST STAR INST. & CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., supra
note 1, at 149. Recall that category two states require legal representation in certain cases,
and in other courts have discretion to appoint an attorney. See generally id.
190. LeVezu, supra note 175, at 158. The study also found that 15% of children had
no advocate after the initial hearing. Id. at 151. Of these children, 72% had their wellbeing completely ignored by the court and other parties. Id. Ignoring the child’s wellbeing and preferences can be detrimental to the judge’s decision. See Mandelbaum, supra
note 81, at 55. Like the state, the judge is supposed to make a decision based on the best
interest of the child. See id. If the judge only hears arguments from the state and the
parent, they may not get all the information they need to make a proper decision. Id.
191. MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILD. IN ABUSE, NEGLECT,
AND DEPENDENCY PROC. § 3 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“This act recognizes the right
of every child to have quality legal representation and a voice in an y abuse, neglect,
dependency, or termination of parental rights proceeding, regardless of developmental
level. . . . A best interest advocate does not replace the appointment of a lawyer for the
child. A best interest advocate serves to provide guidance to the court with respect to the
child’s best interest and does not establish a lawyer-client relationship with the child.”).
192. See IND. CODE § 31-32-3-5 (2019) (“If necessary to protect the child’s interests,
the court may appoint an attorney to represent the guardian ad litem or the court appointed
special advocate.”); GUARDIAN AD LITEM, supra note 57, at 7 (“There is no attorney-client
relationship between the [Child’s Best Interest] Attorney and the child . . . .”).
193. See GUARDIAN AD LITEM, supra note 57, at 15 (“A GAL must always be appointed
to the child when a termination of parental rights petition has been filed or a decision to
pursue a goal of adoption has been made.”).
194. See FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.215(c)(1) (2020) (requiring the GAL to file a written report
that includes a statement of the child’s wishes). To be clear, this Comment does not
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the child, they are not trained to cross-examine witnesses or present evidence
at the same proficiency as the attorneys representing the State and the
parent.195 Furthermore, the GAL’s attorney is going to advocate for what
the GAL wants––to terminate the parental rights. In doing so, the attorney
would cross-examine witnesses and present evidence effectively, but that
does not protect the child’s liberty interest in family integrity.196 Recall
that in Florida, the Best Interest Attorney does not have a relationship with
the child.197 Essentially, the child has no legal counsel advocating for their
liberty interests.198
Additionally, the proposed additional safeguard—guaranteed legal counsel
—provides further protections. Attorneys reduce the amount of time a child
spends in the foster care system, and thereby protect the child’s identified
liberty interests.199 Two major studies shed light on this issue: (1) the QIC
Project and (2) the Palm Beach Study.
presume that a GAL will never advocate for the child’s interest or that a GAL’s opinion
on what would be in the child’s best interest is erroneous. The issue is that without legal
representation, the child cannot adequately present their case to the court to help the judge
come to the fair and adequate ruling.
195. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court discusses
the potential unfairness that arises when one party has representation and the other does
not in Turner v. Rogers. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 447. One of the three factors that persuaded
the Court not to appoint counsel for defendants in child support civil contempt proceedings
was the fact that the opposing custodial parent may not be represented by counsel. Id. at
446. Therefore, providing counsel for the defendant would create an “asymmetry of
representation” that would make the proceedings less fair overall. Id. at 447. The impact
this imbalance could have on families played an important role in the court’s analysis. Id.
The same representation imbalance is happening in dependency proceedings where a child
is only guaranteed a GAL, but the parents and the State have an attorney. See supra
Section V.B.2.b.
196. See generally LeVezu, supra note 175 (arguing that the inclusion of children’s
voices in dependency hearings is critical to ensure the protection of a child’s interest).
197. See GUARDIAN AD LITEM, supra note 57, at 7.
198. See id.; see also Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but Not Heard:
Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76, 77 (1984) (proposing
that young children are too young to direct their own attorney and therefore the child’s attorney
becomes a third party litigant in the case).
199. See ANDREW E. ZINN & JACK SLOWRIVER, EXPEDITING PERMANENCY: LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN IN PALM BEACH COUNTY 1 (2008); DONALD N.
DUQUETTE ET AL., CHILDREN ’S JUSTICE: HOW TO IMPROVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF
CHILDREN IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, at ix, 18 (2016). But see Robert Kelly & Sarah
Ramsey, Do Attorneys for Children in Protection Proceedings Make a Difference? A Study
of the Impact of Representation Under Conditions of High Judicial Intervention, 21 J. FAM.
L. 405, 451 (1983) (finding that the presence of an attorney guardian ad litem had no positive
impact on dependency proceedings).
Almost ten years after Congress passed CAPTA, a study was conducted in North
Carolina to assess the impact of an attorney guardian ad litem on dependency proceedings.
To the authors dismay, the study revealed that attorneys had no impact on preventing
removal or increasing reunification. Id. at 438, 441. Additionally, the presence of an attorney
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In 2009, “the U.S. Children’s Bureau named the University of Michigan
Law School the National Quality Improvement Center on the Representation
of Children in the Child Welfare System (QIC-ChildRep).”200 QIC-ChildRep
gathered information on child representation throughout the country to
create the QIC Best Practice Model of Child Representation (QIC Model)
for attorneys.201 In a study in Washington, children represented by QIC Model
attorneys were 40% more likely to find permanency placements than the
control group.202
The Palm Beach Study in Florida found similar results. The study examined
the impact of the Legal Aid’s Foster Children’s Project (FCP) on the nature
and timing of children’s permanency outcomes in dependency proceedings.203
The program implemented four key activities: “(1) the filing of legal
motions, (2) the filing termination of parental rights petitions and recruitment
of adoptive homes, (3) attendance at staffings and case planning meetings,
and (4) service advocacy.”204 Chapin Hall found that children represented

delayed the reunification process. Id. at 447. The authors attribute these finding to three
key factors: (1) role confusion, (2) lack of training, and (3) the expectation that cases would
not take a significant amount of the attorney’s time. Id. at 453. Role confusion made it
difficult for attorneys to focus on a clear goal and could lead to tension between attorneys
and judges that disagreed about the attorney’s role. Id. at 451. The issue of role confusion
still persists today, but it can be remedied if states provide proper guidance for attorneys serving
as guardians ad litem. See Malempati, supra note 13, at 110. The two second factors are
less of an issue today with the developments in child advocacy law and practice.
The author also raises the issue of adding another bureaucratic layer to the dependency
process. Id. at 120. A similar argument was made by social workers in the Palm Beach
Study. See ZINN & SLOWRIVER, supra, at 20. The issue of added bureaucracy slowing down
dependency proceedings is a valid concern. However, more recent studies have shown
that attorney guardians ad litem increase reunification and permanent placement. See id.
at 1; DUQUETTE ET AL., supra, at viii–ix. Additionally, getting rid of due process requirements
for the sake of efficiency is all too reminiscent of the pre-In re Gault mindset. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
200. DUQUETTE ET AL., supra note 199, at vii.
201. Id.
202. BRITANY ORLEBEKE ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE QIC-CHILDREP BEST PRACTICES
MODEL TRAINING FOR ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
81, 84 (2016).
203. ZINN & SLOWRIVER, supra note 199, at 1.
204. Id. at 2. Note that the first two elements of the FCP––(1) filing legal motions
and (2) filing termination of parental rights petitions and recruitment of adoptive homes–
–are legal services that are better left to an attorney rather than a lay GAL. However, it is
also important to note that not everyone endorsed the FCP method. According to the
authors, social workers were not pleased with the increase in legal motions and termination
of parental rights petitions. Id. They described them as disruptive and a waste of resources. Id.
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by FCP attorneys had a significantly higher rate of exit permanency than
unrepresented children.205 The study also found that children had higher
rates of adoption and long-term custody without significantly lower rates
of reunification.206
By reducing the length of time children spend in foster care, attorneys
protect the three liberty interests discussed earlier. First, speeding up the
reunification process protects the child’s interest in family integrity.207
Second, legal counsel reduces the time spent in foster care and thereby
reduces the likelihood of physical and emotional abuse within the system.208
Lastly, exiting the foster care system into a permanent home would remove
the child from any restrictive congregate placement that may curtail their
physical liberty.209
Overall, attorneys are best suited to protect children’s liberty interests.
GALs lack the training and ethical obligations of attorneys.210 However,
the appointment of a GAL in addition to an attorney could be beneficial
to the dependency process.211 The final step in the Mathews analysis is to
assess the government interest.
c. The Government’s Interest, Including the Function Involved and the
Fiscal and Administrative Burdens of Providing the
Additional or Substitute Procedural Requirements
1. Parens Patriae Interest
The State also has a legitimate interest in the outcome of dependency
proceedings under the parens patriae doctrine.212 States have a strong
interest in the child’s safety and well-being, and in reaching an “accurate

at 9. However, the fact that the FCP model increased the rate of exit permanency proves
the opposite. Id. at 1.
205. Id.
206. Id. The fact that the FCP leads to higher rates of permanency without significantly
impacting reunification is important because lowering the rate of reunification could be
seen as detrimental to both the parent and child’s liberty interest in family integrity. See
supra Section V.B.1.a.
207. See supra Section V.B.1.a.
208. See supra Section V.B.1.b.
209. See supra Section V.B.1.c.
210. See Malempati, supra note 13, at 113–14.
211. See supra note 40.
212. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (“Since the State has an urgent interest in the
welfare of the child, it shares the parent’s interest in an accurate and just decision.”); Kenny
A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 (“As parens patriae, the government’s overriding interest is
to ensure that a child’s safety and well-being are protected.”); In re Dependency of M.S.R.,
271 P.3d at 243 (“[T]he State has a compelling interest in both the welfare of the child and
in an ‘accurate and just decision’ . . . .” (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27)).
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and just decision.”213 These interests are intertwined and requiring courts
to appoint legal counsel for children would further both of them.
Erroneous determinations in dependency proceedings do not further the
States’ interests in protecting the child. If courts erroneously determine
not to remove the child, the abuse and neglect will continue.214 However,
erroneous removal could potentially destroy family unity and subject the
child to further suffering.215 The Supreme Court acknowledged in Lassiter
that ensuring both parties in a dispute have legal representation is largely
beneficial to reaching an accurate and just decision.216 Therefore, providing
children with legal representation in dependency proceedings would further
the states’ parens patriae interest.
2. Monetary Interest
Under the Mathews analysis, courts can consider the cost of providing
a particular method of due process.217 The State will always have an interest
in settling matters in the most economically efficient way possible.218 This
includes the cost involved with appointing legal counsel and the cost of
the lengthy court proceedings that may follow.219 In dependency proceedings,
the cost of providing legal counsel does not skew the analysis against children
for two reasons: (1) the cost does not overcome the children’s liberty interests
and (2) providing legal counsel would save states money.220
First, courts have consistently held that pecuniary interests do not overcome
important private interests, such as those listed above.221 Additionally, the

213. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
214. See supra Section V.B.1.b.
215. See supra Section V.B.1.b.
216. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27–28. According to the Court, failing to provide
counsel for the parent makes the “contest of interests . . . unwholesomely unequal.” Id. at
28. Note that the Court had no reason to address whether the child should also be afforded
legal representation because North Carolina already required legal representation for children
in such matters. Id.
217. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (holding that courts may consider the government’s
interest “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens” that the
additional procedural requirement would entail as part of the Mathews test).
218. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28.
219. Id.
220. See id.; infra notes 225–41 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28 (finding that the states pecuniary interest was
legitimate but “hardly significant enough” to overcome the parent’s interest in family integrity);
Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 (finding that the child’s interest in family integrity and
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Court noted in Lassiter that the potential cost of providing representation in
termination of parental rights proceedings would be “de minimis” compared
to the cost of all criminal actions.222
Second, the appointment of counsel for children in dependency proceedings
would save states money. In an Indiana class action case, Plaintiff’s expert,
Donald Duquette, prepared a return of investment analysis on the benefits
of legal representation in Indiana based on the QIC study.223 In 2016,
Indiana spent $505,443,804 in both state and federal funds on out of home
foster care placement.224 With 20,419 children in Indiana’s foster care system,
the average cost per child per month was $2,063.225 Based on the national
average stay in foster care of twenty-one months, Indiana spent an average
of at least $43,323 per child entering foster care.226 Based on the QIC study,
legal representation for children “reduces the average length of time in foster
care by 16% or 3.36 months.”227 Therefore, providing legal representation
would save Indiana $6,931 per child, calculated at $2,063/month x 3.36
months.228 A single attorney representing one hundred children229 could
save Indiana $693,000. These savings would more than cover the cost of
paying for legal representation.230

health and safety “far outweighs any fiscal or administrative burden” imposed by requiring
legal counsel).
222. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28.
223. Expert Report of Prof. Donald N. Duquette at 21, Nicole K. v. Stigdon, No. 19CV-01521-JPH-MJD (S.D. Ind. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-01525 (7th Cir. Apr. 1,
2020). Donald Duquette is a Clinical Professor Emeritus of Law and the founding director
of Child Advocacy Law Clinic at the University of Michigan Law School. Id. at 1.
224. Id. at 21.
225. Id. This number is comparable to the national average of $2,148, not including court
costs. Id.
226. Id. at 22. These costs do not include court costs or special costs such as special
education and mental health services. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. The National Association of Counsel for Children recommends that an attorney
represent no more than one hundred children in order to perform essential tasks adequately. See
Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1362. In its most recent report on child representation, CAI
found that only 10% of statutes set specific caseload standards and another 12% acknowledged
that attorneys need to comply with “reasonable caseload limits.” F IRST S TAR INST. &
CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., supra note 1, at 23. Additionally, CAI sued Tani Cantil-Sakauye,
the Chair of the Judicial Council of California, over high caseloads for attorneys representing
foster children in Sacramento County. See E.T v. Cantil-Sakauye, 682 F.3d 1121, 1122
(2012). According to CAI, some attorneys were representing as many as 388 children.
FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 376. However, the district court abstained from
considering the claims, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. E.T., 682 F.3d at 1125.
230. The average salary for a GAL attorney in the United States is $68,889. Guardian
Ad Litem Attorney Salary, ZIPRECRUITER, https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/GuardianAd-Litem-Attorney-Salary [https://perma.cc/A4Q8-QRGD].
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Furthermore, the federal government will now reimburse states for up
to 50% of the costs of providing legal representation for children in dependency
proceedings.231 Therefore, states like Indiana and Florida are spending
substantially more money to deny children legal representation.
In addition to the direct costs of providing out of home placement, states
incur other costs when children remain in foster care. Children in foster
care and those who age out of the system are worse off than children that stay
out of the system.232 In 2018, Indiana put together a report on foster children’s
school performance.233 According to the report, only 64% of children in
foster care graduate from high school, compared to the statewide average
of 88%.234 Additionally, students in foster care were twice as likely to be
suspended from school.235
Furthermore, the struggles of foster children carry over into adulthood.
Generally, children that age out of foster care have lower rates of employment
and education, and higher rates of mental illness.236 Only 8% of children
that age out of foster care earn a four-year degree, and foster children typically
earn less than half of what their non-foster care peers earn.237 According
to a national survey, 23% were neither enrolled in education nor employed,
and 43% had experienced homelessness.238 Therefore, extended foster
231. See CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note 47, at 296–97 (“A title IV-E agency that has
an agreement with a tribe or any other public agency under section 472(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the
Act may claim title IV-E administrative costs for legal representation provided by tribal
or public agency attorneys under the agreement in all stages of foster care related legal
proceedings. The title IV-E agency may also claim administrative costs for independent
legal representation provided by an attorney for a candidate for title IV-E foster care or a
title IV-E eligible child in foster care who is served under the agreement, and the child’s
parents, to prepare for and participate in all stages of foster care related legal proceedings.”).
232. FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 349.
233. Shaina Cavazos, Indiana Foster Children are Less Likely to Graduate, More
Likely to be Suspended, a New Report Shows, CHALKBEAT (Apr. 4, 2019, 7:43 PM EDT),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/in/2019/04/04/indiana-foster-children-are-less-likely-tograduate-more-likely-to-be-suspended-a-new-report-shows/ [https://perma.cc/9C7B-MGX8].
234. Id. Furthermore, one in five students in foster care only graduated because they
received waivers allowing them to receive diplomas without having passed state tests, compared
to only 8% of non-foster care students receiving waivers. Id.
235. Id.
236. FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 349.
237. Id.
238. Id. To assist struggling foster children, Congress passed the Fostering Connections
to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 to allow foster children to remain in care
up until age twenty-one. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act,
N. AM . COUNCIL ON ADOPTABLE CHILD . (May 3, 2017), https://www.nacac.org/resource/
fostering-connections-to-success-and-increasing-adoptions-act/ [https://perma.cc/BMB7-
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care stays will also cost states money in the form of welfare and potential
criminal activity.239
Now that the Lassiter presumption and all three Mathews prongs have
been analyzed, they must be weighed against each other to determine if
due process entitles children to legal counsel in dependency proceedings.
First, children in dependency proceedings are uniquely situated to survive
the Lassiter presumption because they face the potential loss of physical
liberty.240 Therefore, only the three Mathews prongs need to be weighed
against each other. Children have strong liberty interests in family integrity,
health and safety, and freedom from bodily restraint. 241 These interests
cannot be adequately protected by a lay GAL who lacks the training necessary
to provide proper legal representation in court.242 Lastly, appointing legal
counsel furthers a State’s parens patriae and monetary interests. Hence,
the three prongs weigh strongly in favor of requiring legal representation.
C. The Argument Against a Case-by-Case Basis
In addition to establishing the Lassiter presumption, the Lassiter case
also allows courts to determine the right to counsel on a case-by-case
basis. However, foster children should have a per se right to counsel because,
as shown above, the Mathews factors always weigh in their favor and
Supreme Court case law supports a categorical right to counsel.243
The Lassiter holding—that parents have no categorical right to legal
counsel in termination of parental rights hearings—can be deceptive.244 If
the permanent severance of the parent-child relationship is not enough to
skew the Mathews factors in favor of legal counsel, then what will? Recall
that all three Mathews factors appeared to favor the appointment of counsel
for parents in dependency proceedings, yet Ms. Lassiter still lost.245 She lost
because the facts of Lassiter were extreme. Not only was Ms. Lassiter

VR29]; Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No 110–351, § 201, 122 Stat. 3949, 3957–58. States that extend their foster care programs
will continue to receive title IV-E funding. FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 334.
As of 2017, twenty-four states that have extended foster care until age twenty-one. Id.
239. See FELLMETH & HELDMAN, supra note 4, at 334.
240. See Malempati, supra note 2, at 212.
241. See supra Section V.B.1.
242. See supra Section V.B.2.b.
243. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 at 13.
244. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31–32.
245. See id. at 31, 33. The Court conceded that the parent’s interest is a “commanding”
one. Id. at 27. It also acknowledged that the State shares the parent’s interests in an accurate
and just decision, and any pecuniary interest the State has is outweighed by the parent’s interest.
Id. at 27–28. Additionally, dependency proceedings may overwhelm an uncounseled parent.
See id. at 30. Taken together, the Mathews factors appear to weigh in favor of legal counsel.
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serving a twenty-five to forty-year sentence for second-degree murder, but
by the time the State filed for a termination of parental rights hearing, she
had not seen her son or tried to contact social services regarding his safety
or whereabouts in over two years.246 Given these circumstances, the Supreme
Court concluded that appointing counsel for Ms. Lassiter would not have
made a “determinative difference.”247
Lassiter is a perfect example of “hard cases make bad law.” If Ms.
Lassiter’s circumstances had been different, perhaps the Court would have
found a per se right to counsel for parents. However, based on her egregious
behavior, the Court concluded that the Mathews factors will not always
overcome the presumption against the right to counsel.248 Nevertheless,
even in an extreme case from the perspective of a child, the Mathews
factors would skew in favor of legal representation. Take the three liberty
interests stated above: family integrity, health and safety, and freedom
from bodily restraint.249 Even in cases where the child does not wish to
reunite with their family, perhaps due to extreme mistreatment, when would
a child not have a strong interest in their personal safety? Or in being free
from bodily restraint? Never. Additionally, appointing legal counsel will
further the States strong parens patriae and pecuniary interests.250
Furthermore, as Justice Blackmun argues in his Lassiter dissent, the
majority departed from past authority when it held that the right to counsel
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.251 In Mathews, the Court
reasoned that the due process analysis applies to the “generality of cases,
not the rare exceptions.”252 Based on this line of reasoning, the Court before
Lassiter, required a case-by-case consideration of due process issues in
different “contexts, not of different litigants within a given context.”253
For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held that welfare recipients as a
class were distinguishable from other recipients of government benefits

246. See id. at 20–21.
247. Id. at 32–33.
248. See id. at 31.
249. See supra Section V.B.1.
250. See supra Section V.B.1.c.
251. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackman also
argues in a footnote that the majority’s decision will impose a greater burden on trial courts
by requiring them to determine in advance whether legal representation would make
a difference in each case. Id. at 51 n.19.
252. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
253. See id. at 49.
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and thus entitled to an evidentiary hearing.254 In contrast, the Court held
in Mathews that Social Security disability recipients as a class were not
similarly situated to welfare recipients and therefore were not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing.255
For these reasons, children should have a per se right to legal counsel
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. This can be achieved
by amending CAPTA to require legal counsel for children in dependency
proceedings.256
VI. SOLUTION
Children’s liberty interests in dependency proceedings need to be protected
by legal counsel. This does not mean that a GAL does not add value to
the dependency process. For example, Mississippi provides children with
an attorney and a GAL.257 On the other hand, states like Michigan require
that the GAL be an attorney, while states like Kentucky have statutes that
require legal counsel without mentioning a GAL.258 Therefore, to ensure
children in dependency proceedings have legal representation while also
allowing the states some discretion, CAPTA should be amended as follows:
In every case involving a victim of child abuse or neglect, which results in a
judicial proceeding, an attorney who has received training appropriate to the role,
including training in early childhood, child, and adolescent development, shall be
appointed to represent the child in such proceedings. The court may also appoint
a guardian ad litem to represent the child. The role of the guardian ad litem shall
be to (1) to obtain first-hand, a clear understanding of the situation and needs of the
child; and (2) to make recommendations to the court concerning the best interests
254. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970), superseded by statute, Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193,
110 Stat. 2105, as recognized in State ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Res., 575 S.E.2d 393, 402 (W. Va. 2002), and Hudson v. Bowling, 752 S.E.2d 313, 321
(W. Va. 2013). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 specifically prohibits individual entitlements to assistance from any state program
receiving funds under the Act. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, § 401(b), 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C § 601).
255. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342.
256. See infra Part VI.
257. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-121(4) (2021) (“The court, including a county court
serving as a youth court, may appoint either a suitable attorney or a suitable layman as guardian
ad litem. In cases where the court appoints a layman as guardian ad litem, the court shall
also appoint an attorney to represent the child.”).
258. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.100(1) (LexisNexis 2020) (“If the court determines,
as a result of a temporary removal hearing, that further proceedings are required, the court
shall advise the child and his parent or other person exercising custodial control or
supervision of their right to appointment of separate counsel . . . .”); Mich. Comp. Laws §
722.630 (2020) (“In each case filed under this act in which judicial proceedings are
necessary, the court shall appoint a lawyer-guardian ad litem to represent the child.”).
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of the child. The child’s attorney may serve as the guardian ad litem so long as
such an appointment does not create a conflict of interest between the child and
the attorney. Otherwise, the court must appoint a separate, qualified individual
to serve as the guardian ad litem, such as a court-appointed special advocate.259

This revision would ensure that children in dependency proceedings get
the high-quality legal representation they deserve. For now, a federal case
is currently on appeal in the Seventh Circuit. The Children’s Advocacy
Institute, Morrison & Foerster LLP, and DeLaney & DeLaney LLC filed
a class action against three Indiana counties on behalf of foster children.260
The case has the potential to create a new binding precedent.261
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, children are entitled to legal counsel in dependency
proceedings under the Fourteen Amendment Due Process Clause. Congress
can incentivize states to provide legal counsel by amending CAPTA as
stated above.262 Providing legal counsel will protect children’s individual
liberty interests and save states money.263 While states may continue to
utilize GALs, a GAL is not an adequate substitute for legal representation.264
Children have their own independent liberty interests and deserve the same
zealous legal advocacy afforded to parents and the State.

259. Note that this revision does not address the issue of what type of client-attorney
model should be adopted. The debate over which type of attorney children in dependency
proceedings is a separate and lengthy analysis. For discussions about what type of representation
children should receive, see generally Malempati, supra note 13, at 110 (analyzing the
best-interest and traditional client-directed lawyer models of representation and arguing
that the dichotomy between the two is false and hinders child representation); Kelly &
LeVezu, supra note 117, at 385 (arguing for a legal-interest advocacy model rather than a
best-interest model for preverbal children). However, regardless of what methodology a
state plans to adopt, the state needs to lay out clear guidelines for attorneys to follow to avoid
role confusion.
260. Nicole K. v. Stigdon, No. 19-CV-01521-JPH-MJD, 2020 WL 1042619, at *1
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-01525 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 2020).
261. See id. at *4.
262. See supra Part VI.
263. See supra Section V.B.2.c.
264. See supra Section V.B.2.b.
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